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Abstract
It is well known that adversarial examples and counterfactual explanations are
based on the same mathematical model. However, their relationship has not yet
been studied at a conceptual level. The present paper fills this gap. We show
that counterfactual reasoning is the common basis of the fields and reliable
machine learning their shared goal. Moreover, we illustrate to what extent
counterfactual explanations can be regarded as the more general concept than
adversarial examples. We introduce the conceptual distinction between feasible
and contesting counterfactual explanations and argue that adversarial examples
are similar to the latter.
Keywords: Counterfactual Explanation, Adversarial Example, XAI,
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1 Introduction
With the emergence of more and more flexible models in machine learning,
such as deep neural networks or random forests, some new1 problems arose.
One problem is the lack of interpretability [Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017, Rudin,
2019]. The solution to this problem has evolved into an area called eXplainable
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) or Interpretable Machine Learning (IML). A variety
of interpretation techniques have been proposed, among which model agnostic
methods e.g. ICE curves [Goldstein et al., 2015], LIME [Ribeiro et al., 2016],
Shapley values [Sˇtrumbelj and Kononenko, 2014], etc. have recently gained
popularity as they do not pose any assumptions on the employed model to be
applicable [Molnar, 2019]. Counterfactual Explanation (CE) [Wachter et al.,
2017] is one of these model agnostic methods. It aims to explain particular
decisions of machine learning classifiers to end-users.
Another problem with highly flexible algorithms is their vulnerability to attacks
and their lack of robustness. Such an attack is called an adversarial example
(AE) [Szegedy et al., 2014]. Especially in the field of computer vision, it has
been shown that successful attacks can be constructed for almost any learning
algorithm [Goodfellow et al., 2015, Yuan et al., 2019]. AEs are specific inputs
that machine learning algorithms misclassify. Thereby AEs aim to deceive these
algorithms and exploit their weaknesses.
Given these entirely different purposes, it is surprising that CEs and AEs share
the same mathematical framework. This similarity on the model-level has been
frequently noted throughout the literature. Wachter et al. [2017] describe AEs as
CEs by a different name. They mention that methods are transferable, but, they
neither discuss the relationship in detail nor specify the transferable techniques.
Molnar [2019] describes AEs as CEs with the aim of deception and points out
the similarity as a single-objective optimization problem. Sharma et al. [2019]
use counterfactuals in their measure of robustness against adversarial attacks
called CERScore and use the terms counterfactual/adversarial interchangeably.
Tomsett et al. [2018] and Ignatiev et al. [2019] both discuss the relationship
between AEs and interpretability, however, without referring to CEs. Sokol and
Flach [2019] discuss CEs in the context of AI safety and note that there is “a
fine line between counterfactual explanations and adversarial examples” that
needs further research.
This paper aims to study and explicate the “fine line” between counterfactual
explanations and adversarial examples. Besides a detailed mathematical analy-
sis of the relationship between CEs and AEs, we will also conceptually compare
the two and examine their common contexts of use. In order to compare CEs
and AEs, we need to analyze each of the two fields. For this analyses, it is
important to focus on aspects that are sufficient to describe both fields [Beaney,
2018].2 Moreover, the aspects should allow to lead an informed discussion about
1one might say old
2Note that our analysis is not a standard conceptual analysis as discussed by Carnap [1998]
or Russell [1905]. Here concepts are defined logically by more basic concepts. Instead we will
concentrate on a holistic picture, which also includes aspects such as the respective roles of
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their relationship. Hence, we have selected the following aspects:
i) conceptual basis,
ii) aim, role, and use cases
iii) models and implementations
The conceptual basis concerns the theoretical and philosophical ideas behind a
concept. It describes a foundation on other, more basic ideas within the con-
ceptual realm. The aim, role, and use cases define the motivation and contexts
in which the concepts are used. Aspect iii) is crucial as it describes the very
definition of a concept in precise mathematical terms. Moreover, it represents
the state of current AI research on the topic.
We start our discussion in Section 2 with three potential misconceptions re-
searchers on CEs and AEs should be aware of. In Section 3 we analyze and
compare CEs and AEs with respect to the aspects introduced above. In the
course of this, we also discuss possible transfers between the two fields. Sec-
tion 4 introduces a conceptual division of two types of CEs, namely feasible
and contesting CEs. It is argued that contesting CEs are similar to AEs. In
Section 5 we reconsider the misconceptions discussed in Section 2 in the light
of our analysis.
2 Three Misconceptions
An analysis of CEs, AEs, and their relationship on the conceptual level is ur-
gently needed. We see several misconceptions that have already led and possibly
will lead to serious confusions. The main goal of this analysis is therefore to
resolve these confusions and lay the foundation for well-guided future research
on both CEs and AEs.
CE is equal to AE: Misconception number one can be summarized as fol-
lows: As CEs and AEs share the same mathematical model, they are the same
object. Authors with this idea in mind like Sharma et al. [2019] use the terms
counterfactual and adversarial interchangeably. This is a misconception regard-
ing the very basis of CEs and AEs. Not only do CEs and AEs have partially
non-overlapping goals, but also must AEs satisfy an additional constraint, which
CEs do not have to satisfy. This constraint is the misclassification of the ad-
versarial. This misconception may lead to a false interpretation of robustness
against attacks and thereby to worse performance and societal acceptance of
machine learning applications. We examine misclassification in detail in Sec-
tion 3.1 and Section 3.3.
the concepts, their use cases, state of the art, etc.
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Feasible CEs are all CEs: A second misconception appears in the context
of CEs. It can be summarized as follows: We want CEs that make sense and
that guide our future actions. Hence, these are the types of CEs that should be
generated for end-users. Researchers focusing on feasibility/actionability of CEs
[Poyiadzi et al., 2020, Mahajan et al., 2019, Karimi et al., 2020] do not usually
claim that these are the only relevant types of CEs. However, they neither
discuss the problems of focusing on such CEs nor discuss potential other types
of CEs. One type that is thereby left out are CEs that focus on the contestability
of a decision. Such CEs provide ground for end-users to contest a decision and
have therefore major legal relevance. Interestingly, contesting CEs show a great
resemblance with AEs. If one were to focus only on feasible CEs, this would
lead to hiding biased algorithmic decisions behind the facade of an explanation.
A discussion of feasibility and contestability is given in Section 3.2 and the
distinction between feasible and contesting CEs is introduced in Section 4.
Transfers, yes or no?: The third misconception is twofold. It either goes like
this: CEs and AEs seem mathematically very similar. So models and algorithms
developed for one side can be fruitfully applied to the other side as well. or like
this: CEs and AEs have nothing to do with each other. Therefore, researchers
on CEs/AEs can ignore the work on AEs/CEs. In the former case, methods
can be misused or hidden assumptions can be adopted..3 In the latter case,
already known techniques are potentially rediscovered.4 To avoid these transfer
problems, we will discuss about the conceptually permissible transfers between
CEs and AEs in Section 3.3 in detail.
We will come back to these three misconceptions in Section 5.
3 CEs & AEs: A Comparison
To give the reader an intuition, we start with two standard examples. The first
describes a loan application scenario and a potential CE in that situation. The
second example illustrates AEs in image recognition tasks.
CE Example: Assume person P wants to obtain a loan and applies for it
through the online portal of a bank. The portal uses an automated, algorithmic
decision system, which decides that Person P will not receive the loan. P wants
an explanation for that decision. An example of a CE would be:
If P had a higher salary and an outstanding loan less, her loan application
would have been accepted.
3E.g Generating counterfactuals based on AE surrogate techniques [Guidotti et al., 2018]
uses local approximations and faces therefore the same critiques as LIME [Molnar, 2019].
4E.g. evolutionary algorithms for mixed data CEs [Sharma et al., 2019].
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AE example: Look at Figure 1 [Papernot et al., 2017]. What makes the
modified images in the second-row adversarial examples is that the small mod-
ifications changed the classification, while for humans the images look almost
the same. Therefore, this change in prediction is unjustified and the system was
successfully tricked.
Figure 1: In the first row, we can see five images (The first two are from the
MNIST dataset, the other three are from the GTSRD dataset.) that are clas-
sified correctly. In the row below, we see the same five pictures but slightly
modified by some noise added to the pictures. Here, they are misclassified.
3.1 Basis
The first aspect we want to investigate is the conceptual basis of CEs and AEs.
We first consider each of them in separation and then conduct our comparison.
Counterfactual Explanations
CEs have a strong philosophical basis and tradition. Here, we will confine
ourselves to counterfactuals in the form of subjunctive5 conditionals. Let S
and Q be propositions. Then, counterfactual sentences are conditionals of the
following form:
If S was true Q would have been true. (1)
Importantly the antecedent of the conditional, namely S is false. A counterfac-
tual explanation is a counterfactual sentence that is true. What makes counter-
factual statements true is hotly debated in philosophy, and no generally accepted
solution has been found [Starr, 2019]. The solution taken up in the computer
science approach builds on the work of Lewis [1973]. In Lewis’s framework Equa-
tion (1) holds if and only if the closest possible world ω′ ∈ Ω to the actual world
5The difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals is that for the latter, the
antecedent must be false [Starr, 2019]. From now on, whenever we talk about counterfactual
statements/sentences/explanations/conditionals we mean subjunctive ones.
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ω ∈ Ω in which S is true6 also Q is true.7 Due to the under-specified notion
of similarity between possible worlds, Lewis’s proposal is highly controversial
[Starr, 2019].
A good counterfactual explanation in a specific situation is a counterfactual
explanation that is helpful to the person for whom the explanation is generated.
This means that the counterfactual explanation is easy to comprehend and has
an interesting8 antecedent/consequent for the explainee [Miller, 2019]. Usually,
in XAI application contexts, the antecedent describes a change in features from
a given input and the consequent describes a change in the outcome of the
classification.
Note that Lewis aimed to describe causality via counterfactuals [Menzies and
Beebee, 2019]. This is mostly not the goal of these types of CEs in XAI.9 The
CE approach allows us to make causal claims about the machine learning model
only (e.g which features does the algorithm take to be causally relevant), but
not about the corresponding real-world objects [Molnar et al., 2020].
Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are inputs that an algorithm assigns the wrong class/value
to.10 A wrong class is defined by the fact that it deviates from a ground truth
given by humans. Not for all inputs there are such ground truths. Especially
for large feature spaces, there are many entirely meaningless inputs. These
meaningless inputs are not considered AEs. What defines adversarial examples
is that the inputs we give appear similar (or identical) to real-world data or
algorithm training data. Generally, this is achieved by modifying a real-world
input. Good AEs are those that can potentially be exploited by an attacker.
AEs are based on a classical picture from game theory, in which a deceiver-agent
tries to trick a discriminator-agent [Dalvi et al., 2004].11 An AE denotes a case
where the deceiver was successful. Adversarial attacks are not specific to neural
networks [Papernot et al., 2016a]. Almost any complex enough system can be
tricked, and even humans are not invulnerable to that [Kahneman et al., 1982,
Chabris and Simons, 2010, Ioannou et al., 2015]. What is special about modern
AEs is that they can often be transferred from one model to another and that
it is particularly hard to get rid of them [Yuan et al., 2019]. The origin of this
effect is still open to debate [Goodfellow et al., 2015, Ilyas et al., 2019].
6As mentioned, above S is false in ω.
7Note that Ω denotes the set of possible worlds.
8This intuitive notion of interestingness is specified in Section 3.2.
9Contrary to Pearl [2009] who introduces CEs with causal meaning. An XAI version of
this type of CEs presents Karimi et al. [2020] in the form of algorithmic recourse. Moreover,
counterfactuals can also account for non-causal explanations as discussed in Reutlinger [2018].
10From now on, we will mainly talk about misclassification and classifying. However, this
is only to simplify our language usage. AEs are not restricted to classification tasks but also
work on regression problems.
11This picture of the two opponents is also the basis of generative adversarial networks
[Radford et al., 2016].
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Comparison
Both fields rely on counterfactual reasoning. CEs describe a variation of the
actual situation/world. AEs are a variation of a real-world input. Also, in both
cases, the variation changes the result. Furthermore, both approaches search
for this variation in regions close to the real world (input) which fulfill certain
constraints.
The crucial difference lies in these constraints. For CEs as given in Equation (1),
the alteration to the actual world described by a predicate S would have to
satisfy that a predicate Q applies. For AEs, an alternative to a real-world input
must be misclassified compared to some ground truth. We can already see how
the later is a specific case of the former where Q is defined as the predicate ’being
misclassified’. Misclassification is generally not demanded for CEs. Conversely,
CEs often demand that Q describes a specific outcome as in our example the
’loan acceptance’.
3.2 Aim, Role, and Use Cases
Now, we investigate the aim, role, and use cases of CEs and AEs.
Counterfactual Explanations
The CE approach in XAI aims to generate local explanations. Here, local means
that the explanations are generated for individual “decisions”12 of the algorithm.
According to Wachter et al. [2017] and Miller [2019] these explanations have
three intuitive aims, which make the difference between (only) a CE and a good
CE. The aims are to
i) raise understanding13,
ii) give guidance for future actions, and
iii) allow to contest decisions.
Not all three of these goals need to be met together for an explanation to be
considered good. In many contexts, explanations focus on only one or two of
the three goals.
Aim i): The target audience of CEs are laypersons who are neither experts in
machine learning nor have unlimited time resources [Wheeler, 2020]. If we want
to improve a person’s understanding, we must respect these resource limitations
and focus on the few, central reasons for a decision. To achieve this degree
of simplicity in our explanations, we must be economical with respect to the
number of reasons we give. For this reason, sparsity is one aim when CEs are
discussed in the literature.
12By “decisions” we usually mean classification or regression tasks the algorithm was opti-
mized for.
13Pa´ez [2019] argues that counterfactuals as given by Wachter et al. [2017] can even in
principle not meet this requirement.
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Aim ii): Explanations should serve as a guideline for future actions. Hence,
the alternative that reaches the desired output (e.g. obtaining the loan) should
not be unreachable for the explainee. For example, a loan applicant cannot
become younger in order to obtain a loan, even if age is one of the bank’s criteria
for justified reasons. Thus, it does not seem to be a reasonable recommendation
to propose a reduction in age for obtaining a loan. Such limitations on our
explanations are summarized in the literature under the term feasibility.
Aim iii): Explanations provide grounds for the appealability of decisions. A
decision can be contested if the reasons given are poor. This may be because
the decision is based on features that should not play a role (e.g. skin color
or gender), or on features that should play a role but are expected to have
a different effect (e.g. if a high salary is negatively correlated with obtaining
a loan). All in all, we want to be treated fairly and demand explanations to
uncover unfair judgments [Kusner et al., 2017, Asher et al., 2020]. If we feel
unfairly judged, this is because we would have expected a different decision.
Thus, the explanation we generate should focus on features that the explainee
expected to have a different effect on the decision. In other words, explanations
should be informative.14
Role: Among XAI researchers, CEs became very popular. One reason is that
they are model agnostic and therefore applicable to any kind of algorithm. Sec-
ondly, there is a one-to-one correspondence to contrastive explanations, which
are the type of explanations that people use most often in everyday life [Miller,
2019]. Thirdly, CEs are compatible with the right to explanation in the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [Wachter et al., 2017]. All
these advantages allow the CE approach to play an important role in XAI.
Use Cases: The use cases of CEs are in generally unlimited. In principle,
CE can be applied to any kind of algorithm. The only requirements are that
the input and output space is interpretable and that we can define a reasonable
distance measure on these spaces. Despite that, CEs are almost exclusively
considered in connection with classification tasks on tabular data. Unsuper-
vised/Reinforcement learning, image/audio classification, or regression prob-
lems are still under-explored in this respect.15 Whether CEs should actually
be applied on a broad scale is at least questioned [Laugel et al., 2019, Barocas
et al., 2020].
14The condition of informativeness also aids aim number one, which is to raise understand-
ing. In the context of psychology, informativeness is discussed under the name abnormality
[Miller, 2019].
15One counterexample to this is the work on the MNIST dataset by Van Looveren and
Klaise [2019].
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Adversarial Examples
The aim of AEs depends to a large extent on the perspective taken and the in-
tended use case. This can be the perspective of the academic researcher working
on AEs, the engineer trying to protect against attacks, or the attacker trying to
abuse the system. The principal aims that all perspectives share are
i) to fool the system,
ii) to do this imperceptibly. and
iii) effectively.
Even though AEs represent only single instances16 in which the algorithm fails,
they also point to the algorithm’s global problems. If the algorithm classifies a
stop sign as a right-of-way sign, one becomes extra cautious about everything
the algorithm does. What do the aims imply for our approach to the problem?
Aim i): The main aim of AEs is to fool the system. That is, we look for
missclassifications. The system usually performs fairly well on training data
and similar inputs. On the other hand, it performs poorly on inputs that are
in unseen regions. If we look at any input from unseen regions of our input
space, we most likely choose a meaningless data point.17 So we need to find an
input that is close enough to a meaningful input and yet in a region where the
algorithm performs poorly.
Aim ii): One condition under which we must search for adversarials is im-
perceptibility. AEs should not be easy to detect for a human, i.e. the changes
in input should be below the threshold of human perception. This guarantees
the highest chance of deceiving successfully. Since human perception directs
attention to certain features and expectations, imperceptibility can be achieved
by changes in features that are not payed attention to. Imperceptibility can
also be achieved by keeping the number of changed features or the intensity of
changes below the threshold of perception.
Aim iii): What makes an effective AE depends strongly on the context. At-
tackers want to exploit mistakes in the most profitable way possible (e.g. money
gain or system damage). Engineers want to defend themselves against such at-
tacks and make their system more stable against them (e.g. fixing bugs or
detecting attacks). Researchers working on AEs strive for a deeper understand-
ing of learning algorithms, a depiction of real-world dangers in employing algo-
rithms, and high research impact.
16They can also be aiming at a global level and a variety of algorithms such as shown by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017].
17Especially considering images
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Role: AEs are both a blessing and a curse. They can indeed cause great harm
to individuals, companies, and society as a whole. The more social or ethical
consequences the task we assign to a machine learning algorithm has, the worse
the effect of misclassification. A stop sign classified as a right of way sign can
cause accidents, and a rifle misclassified as a turtle can facilitate terrorist attacks
at airports. The trust we have in AI systems is and will be closely linked to the
extent to which AEs on them are possible. On the positive side, AEs can help
us understand how the algorithm works [Ignatiev et al., 2019, Tomsett et al.,
2018]. Knowing where the algorithm has problems helps us understand what the
algorithm is really learning [Lu et al., 2017]. Moreover, by adversarial training
AEs can even concretely improve our model [Bekoulis et al., 2018, Stutz et al.,
2019].
Use Cases: AEs are mostly built for image and sometimes audio recognition
tasks.18 Reasons for that are uncontroversial ground-truths, the boom in com-
puter vision, and the resemblance with optical illusions [Elsayed et al., 2018].
Comparison
Both fields can help to understand what the algorithm has learned. Moreover,
both contribute to the identification of biases and even offer methods to elimi-
nate these biases through adversarial- or counterfactual-training [Bekoulis et al.,
2018, Sharma et al., 2019]. However, while improving understanding and high-
lighting algorithmic problems is usually only a byproduct of AEs, it is the focus
of CEs. The deception of a system, on the other hand, is essential for AEs, but
a potential byproduct of CEs in cases where they disclose too much information
about the algorithm [Sokol and Flach, 2019].19
Making modifications imperceptible is crucial for AEs. In the case of CEs, how-
ever, the modifications form the core of the given explanation. This is more
a difference in presentation and less one in the type of modifications. Mod-
ifications to achieve the imperceptibility of AEs show a great similarity with
modifications in CEs that aim at informativeness. Imperceptible AEs result
from modifications in unnoticed/unanticipated features which nevertheless in-
fluence the result. These surprisingly effective changes are exactly those which
are most informative to humans, as will be discussed in Section 4.
In order for the feature permutations in CEs to make sense, it is usually neces-
sary that the input space provides a certain degree of interpretability. This is
not relevant for AEs, since the changes are hidden and not highlighted.20
18On case of AEs for tabular data give Ballet et al. [2019].
19Meaning that giving guidance for future actions and deceiving are only compatible for
immoral agents.
20One difference that might be pointed out is that CEs generally only tell us something
about how an algorithm works in a very local region around a particular example while
finding an AE affects confidence in the system as a whole. However, in cases where the CEs
reveal racist, sexist, or causally unjustified reasons, this will also reduce our confidence in the
system as a whole, not just locally.
11
The two approaches play a similar role within the machine learning landscape,
as both will strongly affect people’s trust in machine learning systems in the
future. In addition, both fields have gained increasing legal relevance. In order
to be legally applicable (e.g. in autonomous driving, airport security [Athalye
et al., 2017], etc.), machine learning algorithms must be both robust against
AEs and provide explanations to end-users as specified in the GDPR.21 A major
difference is that AEs, by definition, can only point to mistakes of the algorithm.
Hence, emerging AEs mainly have a negative role, while CEs can also raise trust
in the system.
Considering the use cases, it can be seen that AEs are almost exclusively con-
sidered for computer vision tasks, while CEs consider almost exclusively tabular
data as input.22
3.3 Models and Implementations
The last conceptual aspect that we want to investigate concerns the models and
implementations of CEs and AEs.
Counterfactual Explanations
There are a variety of formulations of the CE framework. The present version
orients at Wachter et al. [2017]. Assume there is a learning algorithm23, which
we represent by a function f : I → O mapping a vector x from an interpretable
(potentially high dimensional) input space I to a vector y in an output space O.
Assume the desired classification for x would be y′ 6= y. Then, a counterfactual
vector xc,y′ to x is a vector that minimizes the term ‖xc,y′ − x‖ for which
f(xc,y′) = y
′. Often it is sufficient that xc,y′ is close to x. Also, having f(xc,y′)
close to y′ can be sufficient as it might be in principle impossible or very difficult
to reach. Thus, the standard formulation as a single-objective optimization
problem is
argmin
x′∈I
‖x− x′‖+ λ |||f(x′)− y′||| (2)
where ‖ · ‖ and ||| · ||| are induced by some measures of distance on I and O
respectively.24 The scalar λ trades off between a more similar counterfactual
and a vector closer to the desired output. The counterfactual explanation is
derived by the difference between the original input and the counterfactual
vector we generated put into words. Consider, for instance, the loan application
scenario 3 and assume that xc,y′−x has a value of +2000e at the feature salary
and a value of −1 at the feature open loans. Then, the corresponding CE would
be
21CEs comply with the standards given by the right to explanation in the GDPR [Wachter
et al., 2017].
22Even though there are the above mentioned counterexamples to that division [Van Loov-
eren and Klaise, 2019, Ballet et al., 2019].
23Usually this algorithm is already trained.
24They don not necessarily have to be norms.
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• If P earned 2000e more per year and had one outstanding loan less, her
loan application would have been accepted.
Distance Measures: As in Lewis’s framework from Section 3.1, the main
difficulty is to define a reasonable distance measure on our input space. As
discussed in Section 3.2, good CEs are sparse, feasible, and informative.
Sparsity is well studied in the general machine learning literature in different
areas [Bach, 2010]. In the field of CE, Wachter et al. [2017] gain sparsity by using
the normalized Manhattan metric. Other ways to attain sparsity include setting
features as not permutable [Moore et al., 2019], using the L0 metric to directly
penalize high numbers of changed features, using multi-objective optimization
with the number of changed features as one objective [Dandl et al., 2020], or
taking into account the causal structure of the real world where changing a few
features via an action has consequences for several others [Karimi et al., 2020].25
Feasibility can be achieved in a number of ways and depends on the perspective
or problem you start with. One possibility is to declare some features as im-
mutable, which makes them irrelevant for the explanation [Moore et al., 2019,
Sokol and Flach, 2019]. The second way focuses on the problem that some pos-
sible input vectors represent highly improbable or unreachable combinations of
features in the real world. They should therefore not be proposed as reason-
able CE. In the literature, there are several suggestions how to deal with this
problem, for example, by considering the probability density of inputs [Sharma
et al., 2019], the distance to the training data [Dandl et al., 2020], the causal
structure of the real world [Karimi et al., 2020, Mahajan et al., 2019], or the
lengths of the paths between the original input and the counterfactual [Poyiadzi
et al., 2020].26
While sparsity and feasibility are discussed throughout the literature, infor-
mativeness has so far not been taken into account. The reason might be
that for informativeness we demand information about the explainee’s esti-
mates/expectations to which we usually do not have access. However, some
solved this problem by asking the user questions about her preferences [Sokol
and Flach, 2019]. Another option is to focus on the features that the average
human usually over- or underestimates. Best would be a combination of the two,
i.e. to set the prior characteristics by the average human and then to update
this prior via feedback of the human agent.
Not only on the input space it might be difficult to find a suitable measure
of distance but also on the output space. Consider a classification problem,
where the output space is given by a set of probability density functions on the
different categories. If the desired output is “loan application accepted” it is
unclear whether this means that it has the highest value among the categories,
more than fifty percent or even the value 100%. Moreover, some outcomes might
be more similar to the desired outcome than others e.g. obtaining a smaller
25Moore et al. [2019] also introduce the idea to show a range of explanations with a diverse
number of changed features.
26They combine blocking inpermutable features and avoiding unrealistic inputs.
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loan is better than obtaining no loan. Standard measures like KL-divergence or
cross-entropy are ignorant to such similarity differences.
Solution Methods: The solution strategy for the optimization problem de-
pends on the model-knowledge. As the developers of IML techniques are usually
also to designers of the inspected algorithm, full model access is common. Given
such a white box, the problem can be solved by gradient based methods [Wachter
et al., 2017, Mothilal et al., 2020, Mahajan et al., 2019]. An alternative for mixed
numeric/categorical data are mixed-integer linear program solvers [Ustun et al.,
2019, Russell, 2019]. Genetic algorithms are a solution method that does not
require model knowledge [Sharma et al., 2019, Dandl et al., 2020]. A more con-
troversial, technique that works for black-box scenarios is to train a surrogate
model on the original model and then transfer the CEs from the surrogate to
the original model Guidotti et al. [2018].27
Selection Problem: The solution to the optimization problem will generally
not be unique. There can be a high number of equally close CEs for the same
input vector. Worse, these different CEs may provide explanations that are
pairwise incompatible as for instance the following two:
• If P earned 2000e more per year, her loan application would have been
accepted.
• If P earned 2000e less per year, her loan application would have been
accepted.
Such cases arise since the decision boundaries do not follow classical monotonic-
ity constraints. It is possible, for example, that loan applications from people
below a certain salary level are subsidized by the state. Some propose therefore
to present several different CEs like Mothilal et al. [2020], Moore et al. [2019],
Wachter et al. [2017], Dandl et al. [2020]. But then the question arises, how
many and which ones? Others propose to select a certain CE according to a
quality standard set by the user, such as complexity or particularly interesting
features [Sokol and Flach, 2019]. The question remains open as to how this
so-called Rashomon effect can be solved.
Adversarial Examples
There are a variety of formulations of the AE framework. The version presented
here orients at Yuan et al. [2019]. Since the framework is basically the same as
in the case of CE, we will mainly focus on the deviations from it. Again, the
learning algorithm is represented by a function f : I → O mapping a vector
x from an input space I to a vector y in an output space O. For AEs, no
interpretability on the input space is required. There are two cases. Either, a
27Problems occur if the surrogate model is not faithful to the original model. In such cases,
the CEs generated are simply false and potentially misleading.
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particular alternative output y′ 6= y is desired as in the case of CEs, which is
called a targeted attack. Or, the alternative output just has to differ from y in
which case we talk about a non-targeted attack. For a non-targeted attack, an
AE xa to x is generated by searching for an xa that minimizes ‖xa − x‖ and
for which f(xa) 6= f(x). In case we do have a particular alternative output in
mind, the adversarial xa,y′ to x is a vector that minimizes the term ‖xa,y′ − x‖
for which f(xa,y′) = y
′. The formulation as a single objective optimization
problem is again given by Equation (2). As in the case of CEs, the minimality
might not be as important and it is enough to find inputs close enough to x
that change the classification in the desired way. Considering inputs in greater
distance might not only be computationally easier but also more interesting in
some cases [Elsayed et al., 2018].
More important is that this input is in fact misclassified. Notice that this is
guaranteed by none of the above formulations as optimization problems. To
achieve this, we must add the condition that the alternative input is incorrectly
classified.28 In other words, for the adversarial xa, respectively xa,y′ has to hold
f(xa) 6= ytrue respectively f(xa,y′) 6= ytrue. Here, ytrue denotes the actually
correct label for the adversarial example. Clearly, this true label is usually the
same as the one for our original input x, namely y.
The optimization problem presented here is only one among many others [Yuan
et al., 2019]. Also, formulating an optimization problem is not the only way of
finding AEs. The fast gradient sign method of Goodfellow et al. [2015] is an
example of how to generate AEs directly.
Distance Measures: One of the most important problems in creating an AE
is the reasonable definition of a distance measure on the input space. We must
be computationally able to minimize this measure, but, it should also allow us to
find good AEs. This leads us to the aims of misclassification, imperceptibility,
and effectiveness.
Again, minimizing the difference between x and its adversarial xa, with the effect
of flipping the algorithms assignment, does not guarantee to attain an AE. A
switch in classification due to a small variation may be justified.29 However,
since we are often dealing with image data, a tiny variation30 rarely justifies
a switch in classification. It, therefore, makes it an AE. If we look at image
data, there are usually infinitely many meaningless data points between two
proper classes. Hence, following the gradient [Goodfellow et al., 2015], the
Jacobian [Papernot et al., 2016b] or any other reasonable procedure [Yuan et al.,
2019] may easily lead you to an AE. Another perspective on the problem of
misclassification can be found in Section 4.
28In the case of a regression problem, this could correspond to being far outside the range
of reasonable output values, see Balda et al. [2019].
29An example, is a case where a loan application for person P with the age of 17 years and
364 days is rejected while a person with the same characteristics but three days older would
receive the loan.
30Often this variation is not only small in the sense of a p-norm, it is moreover structureless
noise.
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Imperceptibility is realized in various ways in the literature. Some change very
few or even one feature strongly by optimizing for the L0 norm [Su et al., 2019].
Others alter more features to a smaller amount with the L1 norm [Carlini et al.,
2018], or in a variety of real-world contexts and scenarios, like Brown et al.
[2017], Athalye et al. [2017]. The standard way to gain imperceptibility is to
alter all features slightly via the L∞ norm on the input space [Goodfellow et al.,
2015, Szegedy et al., 2014]. Basically, any p-norm can be reasonably applied
[Yuan et al., 2019]. More interesting are measures that take into account what
humans consider as “close” inputs [Rozsa et al., 2016, Athalye et al., 2017]. This
also leads to an overlap between human and machine deceivability [Elsayed et al.,
2018]. With tabular data, it is much harder to define what imperceptibility is.
Ballet et al. [2019] solved this via defining critical and non-critical features31.
Since the algorithm uses both types of features in the classification, they modify
only non-critical features to attain a change in assignment. This shows how
imperceptibility and misclassification go hand in hand.
Effectiveness is not so much a question of defining the distance measure, but
rather a question of which example we use to build our AE.
Solution Methods: The main focus of the community is on the algorithmic
generation of AEs, which again differs dependent on model knowledge. For
white boxes, there are gradient-based methods, either for solving the optimiza-
tion problem [Szegedy et al., 2014, Athalye et al., 2017, Brown et al., 2017] or
for the direct generation of AEs [Goodfellow et al., 2015]. Other options include
the Jacobian [Papernot et al., 2016b] or neural network feature representations
[Sabour et al., 2016]. In addition to white-box attacks, there are a number of
black-box solution methods such as the approximation of gradients via symmet-
ric differences [Chen et al., 2017] or evolutionary algorithms [Guo et al., 2019,
Alzantot et al., 2019, Su et al., 2019]. Due to the transferability of AEs, it is
often also possible to build an AE for a surrogate model and then apply the AE
to the original model [Papernot et al., 2017]. Generally, non-targeted attacks
are computationally less costly and do more easily transfer to other systems
than targeted attacks [Yuan et al., 2019].
Selection Problems: If we want to generate an AE, we are faced with two
selection problems, neither of which has been discussed in the literature so far.
Both depend on the desired effect. The first selection problem is: Based on
which original input vector should the AE be generated? The second selection
problem is: Given we get several AEs as solutions of the optimization problem,
which AEs should we select?
A solution to the first selection problem relates to effectiveness and depends on
three things: What is the application? Why do we want to deceive? Which
are the weaknesses of the system? If we consider e.g. image recognition from a
researcher’s perspective and we want to illustrate the problems of autonomous
driving, it makes a lot of sense to focus on safety issues. In cases like fraud, the
31Based on expert evaluation
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choice is determined by the weaknesses of the system and its susceptibility to
exploitation. From an engineering perspective, where protection is central, AEs
are selected that pose the biggest threat.
The second selection problem we face is similar to the one in the case of CEs.
Again, we should pick the AE that best suits our needs. However, since here
the deceiver can pick the AE herself without constraints in resources this is not
a very central problem.
Comparison
There is no need for researchers to reinvent the wheel. Since the two mathemat-
ical frameworks are very closely linked, we will additionally to our conceptual
comparison, discuss potential transfers between the fields shown in Figure 2.
The common ground with regard to the mathematical model is evident. In
Appendix A we show that AEs are special solutions to a (non-targeted) CE
optimization problem.
Theorem (Every (targeted ) AE is a (targeted ) CE). For all x ∈ I,
f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O,  > 0 and distance measures ‖ · ‖ holds:
i) AE(x, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ CE(x, , ‖ · ‖)
ii) TAE(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TCE(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖)
iii) AE(x, ‖ · ‖) ⊆ CE(x, ‖ · ‖)
iv) TAE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TCE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖)
This means that (targeted) AEs are (targeted) CEs that are misclassified. As
we show, this holds also for AEs and CEs in a given environment . However,
it is important to point out here that non-targeted attacks are common while
non-targeted counterfactuals are rather rare. Moreover, some formulations as
optimization problems already encode the respective aims as in the case of e.g.
Dandl et al. [2020], Van Looveren and Klaise [2019] for CEs and e.g. Carlini
and Wagner [2017] for AEs. For formulations that are targeted and where the
respective aims are not encoded in the optimization problem, transfers between
the fields are permissible. Interestingly, we do not necessarily need to formulate
an optimization problem to generate AEs [Goodfellow et al., 2015]. Direct gen-
eration methods are theoretically also possible for counterfactuals, even though
the generated CEs will be much harder to justify conceptually.
The different aims are mostly not encoded in the optimization problem but in the
distance measure. For that reason, we find the biggest differences between the
fields if we consider the distance measures. However, there are also similarities
to be found. Notions of distance that realize sparsity show commonalities with
those that realize imperceptibility. A change in few among lots of features is
often difficult to spot [Su et al., 2019]. Especially when the change is not pointed
at. Distance measures that favor sparsity can, therefore, be desirable to transfer
between the fields. Moreover, distributed changes to achieve the imperceptibility
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Figure 2: On the left-hand side, you see the counterfactual realm and on the
right-hand side the corresponding adversarial concepts. Solid arrows between
two items mean that a transfer is allowed in that direction. Dashed arrows
mean that a transfer is possible under additional conditions, specified below the
arrows.
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of AEs in e.g. images are not per se irrelevant for CEs. Sparsity of CEs is only
important for changes in interpretable features. For non-interpretable features,
distributed changes can often be described as sparse changes in more abstract
interpretable features. This may allow for further transfers from AE to CE
distance measures.
The CE aim of informativeness and the AE aim of imperceptibility can also
align. This alignment is discussed further in Section 4. Changing unexpected
but effective features will very often lead to changes that are imperceptible if
we are not explicitly pointed to them. The same holds vice versa. Hence, fruit-
ful transfers can be expected. Feasibility in CEs requires that the alternative
data point generated can realistically be reached by the explainee. Realistic
data-points are those that are generally well represented in the training data.
Hence the algorithm usually performs well in such cases and thereby feasibility
counteracts the goal of misclassification. However, distance measures that have
feasibility encoded could potentially be reversed to aid the aim of misclassifi-
cation. Furthermore, there are cases where feasibility can be relevant for AEs
such as anomaly detection or the generation of realistic AEs.
Due to their similarity in the optimization problem, the two approaches also
use similar solution methods. This parallelism can be observed in the develop-
ment of the fields. Both started with gradient-based methods, proceeded with
evolutionary algorithms, and then considered surrogate models.32 If applicable,
solution methods developed for CEs can be easily used to generate AEs. The
opposite direction might be more problematic. For CEs, approximately good so-
lutions might not be good enough as they lead to bad/misleading explanations.
This problem becomes particularly clear when we look at surrogate model ap-
proaches that are highly popular among AE researchers. If the surrogate model
is not faithful enough to the original model, the generated CEs will end up being
wrong and, in the worst-case, misleading.
It is already noteworthy that both fields face selection problems. Moreover,
both face the selection problem among potential final AEs/CEs and it is an
option to not only select one but several CEs/AEs. However, when generating
AEs, the selection of the initial input is open, whereas in the case of CEs the
selection is determined by the end-user. Moreover, the second selection problem
also differs. First, unlike in CEs the solution space to non-targeted AEs contains
vectors from different classes. Second, the number of CEs we can show is limited
by humans’ capacity to process information, while the number of AEs we can
try in deceiving a system is generally unlimited. And even if we were to try
to limit the number of vectors selected, it is highly unclear how solving the
problem on the one hand would help solve the problem on the other. We would
32Interestingly, the areas concentrate on different solution methods. While in the litera-
ture on AEs mainly white box solvers are discussed, the literature on CEs mainly deals with
black-box solvers. This is unexpected since AEs are usually considered from the perspective
of an attacker without access to the model, while CEs are often built by the model engineers.
A look at the use cases explains this paradox. Given low-dimensional tabular data and stan-
dard algorithms, simple black box attacks are perfectly feasible. For high dimensional image
data and deep convolutional neural networks, on the other hand, black-box attacks explode
computationally.
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need clear criteria as to what constitutes the better CE/AE, but the respective
quality criteria and potential ranking functions might vary.
4 The Two Types of CEs
Until now we have discussed the similarities, differences and possible transfers
between CEs and AEs. However, we have so far left out the relationship at the
level of individual instances. Does a good CE make a good AE or vice versa? In
this section we will present a conceptual division into two types of CEs. We call
them feasible CEs and contesting CEs. Feasible CEs are reasonable explanations
from which recommendations for future actions can be derived. Contesting CEs
are those that provide a basis for challenging an automated decision. AEs are
very closely linked to the latter. We believe that this clarification may clear
up some existing misunderstandings regarding the relationship between CEs
and AEs. To clarify these issues, we will look at different scenarios that are
manifested in the real world with different causal structures.
For all the presented scenarios we presuppose the following:
• There is a supervised machine learning algorithm represented by a function
f : I → O mapping a vector x from a (potentially high dimensional)
input space I to a vector y in an output space O. This machine learning
algorithm is trained on a training set.
• There is an actual causal relation between variables. What does this
mean? The input space I and the output space O of the algorithm f
are defined as Cartesian products of sets of features I and O. Each of
these features relates to or is derived by some real-world properties. The
real-world objects have specific causal relations, for which exists a true
causal graph C. Often relevant features to complete the causal picture are
missing. There are two ways to deal with such cases. One is to allow for
latent variables Pearl [2009]. Option two is to ignore the incompleteness
of the feature selection.33 Since the latter is what is usually done in
supervised learning contexts, we follow that procedure. We will call F ∈ I
a causally relevant feature for T ∈ O if either
– F is an ancestor node of T in the causal graph C or
– there is a common cause L 6∈ I ∪O of both F and T that is not part
of the causal graph.34
We say F ∈ I is a causally irrelevant feature for T ∈ O if neither of the
two conditions is met.
33Some features might even be inaccessible.
34Causal relevance in the first condition is clear. In the second condition, we allow the
algorithm to assume that a change in the correlated feature F to T was due to a change in
the variable L.
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• In decision making, humans pay mostly attention to variables they con-
sider relevant for the task [Jehee et al., 2011]. Well trained decision mak-
ers therefore focus on causally relevant variables [Navalpakkam and Itti,
2005]. Hence, they often oversee changes in causally irrelevant features,
which makes these changes imperceptible.
• For our example scenarios, again consider loan applications. For simplicity,
we make the unrealistic assumption that the input space I only contains
information about the features salary and the number of dogs. The output
space O is a binary feature that either takes the value 1 for loan acceptance
and 0 for loan denial. We assume that Figure 3 expresses the actual causal
relationship of the involved variables. That means that the number of
dogs should be irrelevant for loan approval given we know the salary. A
high salary is a good reason for loan acceptance and also a necessary
condition for having many dogs (which are generally expensive). Thereby,
the features number of dogs and loan approval are correlated. This causal
graph will help us in depicting the relation between feasible and contesting
CEs in different scenarios. The setting is inspired by Ballet et al. [2019]
who built AEs for tabular data.
salary
dogs loan
Figure 3: The causal graph contains three variables, salary, the number of dogs,
and a binary variable for the loan application status.
Both types of CEs we introduce here indicate the features that the algorithm
considered relevant for the decision process. However, they differ in the kind of
features they change. Feasible CEs permute causally relevant features. Contest-
ing CEs on the other side point out which causally irrelevant features played a
role in the decision process. Mixed type CEs where both causally relevant and
irrelevant features are permuted are also possible and will be discussed.
4.1 Feasible CEs
To make the division maximally clear, we consider a scenario where only feasible
CEs exist. These cases occur in the presence of perfect algorithms. A perfect
algorithm describes a case where the algorithm’s decisions match the ground
truth in all scenarios where such a ground truth exists. That is, if we consider
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an input x ∈ I then f(x) is correctly classified. In this case, no AE exists since
misclassification is a necessary condition for an AE. Good CEs on the other side
do exist.35
Scenario: Assume the algorithm f is perfect. Thus, for any combination of
the number of dogs and the salary for which a ground truth exists, the algorithm
maps exactly to that ground truth. Hence, the algorithm learned that all that
is relevant for loan acceptance is the salary, and given a certain threshold t is
reached the algorithm grants the loan. If the applicant has a salary s below t
and a given number of dogs d, the counterfactual vector would be (t, d). The
corresponding CE would be:
• If P’s salary was (t − s)e higher, her loan application would have been
accepted.
This would indeed be a good CE because it aids understanding and guides
future actions. This is exactly what feasible CEs aim at. Feasible CEs permute
causally relevant properties to the right amount.
4.2 Contesting CEs
AEs do not exist for perfect algorithms. As we will see later, contesting CEs are
just like AEs. Thus, we need to take the step from the exceptional case of perfect
algorithms to imperfect algorithms. Imperfect algorithms make some assign-
ments that do not match the ground truth. There are two kinds of reasons for
this. First, classical reasons as for instance over-/under-fitting, biased/lacking
training data, missing features, etc [Bishop, 2006]. The second kind of reason is
more principled. Supervised learning algorithms lack the ability to distinguish
between causes and correlations [Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018]. Therefore, vari-
ables that only correlate but have no causal relationship with the target variable
do in fact have impact on the classification. While there are various ways to
get rid of the first kind of problems [Claeskens et al., 2008, Good and Hardin,
2012, Jabbar and Khan, 2015], getting causality into supervised learning is much
harder [Scho¨lkopf, 2019].
Both kinds of reasons lead to classifications that mismatch the ground truth.
Thus, in both cases some features have an undesired impact on the target vari-
able. This mismatch can be used in creating good AEs but also good CEs. The
following example will show a scenario where only contesting CEs exist but no
feasible CEs.
Scenario: For the sake of the argument, assume that a bank collected data
from the members of two clubs. The first club is a dog-club in Zurich (Switzer-
land) and the second is an animal protection club in Ukraine. It is clear that
this data collection is biased. Let us also assume that the model trained by
35This again makes clear that the class of CEs is broader than of AE as shown in the
Appendix A + B.
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the bank is a single-layer decision tree. Then, the algorithm may have learned
that the number of dogs is the only important feature for deciding on a loan
application. If a person has more or equal to one dog, the algorithm offers the
loan.
Assume the loan applicant has a low salary s and one dog. In this case, the
loan application would be rejected. This decision would be correct according
to the ground truth since the salary was too low. However, the reason for the
algorithm’s decision would be that threshold two for the number of dogs was
not reached. A CE, in this case, would be:
• If P’s had one more dog, her loan application would have been accepted.
This would indeed be a good CE since it points us to the reason the algorithm
had for its decision. It would increase the applicant’s understanding of the
algorithm, would allow her to contest the decision, and in case she really urges
for money she could use this information to deceive the algorithm. This is
exactly how contesting CEs are characterized. Interestingly, an AE would be
described by the same vector (s, 2) and could potentially have the very same
function, namely deceiving the system.
4.3 Mixed CEs
Usually, we do neither deal with the perfect algorithms from Section 4.1 nor the
terrible algorithms of Section 4.2. Instead, we often have pretty good algorithms
that mostly focus on relevant features to the right amount but sometimes make
misclassifications. In such scenarios, we potentially have feasible, contesting,
and also mixed CEs in which causally relevant and causally irrelevant features
are perturbed.
Scenario: Consider again an imperfect algorithm as discussed in Section 4.2.
However, this time, the model selection and the data collection were carried out
more carefully and all potential kind 1 fallacies have been avoided. As a result,
the algorithm has learned, based on the training data, that the salary is relevant
for loan acceptance. Also, dogs are expensive, and therefore only people with
a comparatively high salary can afford dogs. Since the algorithm only matches
patterns and cannot tell non-causal dependencies from actual causes apart, it
will learn that the number of dogs is (slightly) relevant for loan acceptance.
Now, consider an applicant with a salary s very close to reaching the decision
boundary t of loan acceptance. The applicant has no dogs. In accordance with
the ground truth, the loan application gets rejected since s is below t. However,
the algorithm is not perfect. It learned that additional to the salary the number
of dogs is marginally relevant for the applicant obtaining the loan. There is
potentially a variety of CEs. Three possible CEs could be
i) If P’s salary was (t − s)e higher, her loan application would have been
accepted.
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ii) If P’s had two more dogs, her loan application would have been accepted.
iii) If P’s salary was (t−s)2 e higher and she had one more dog, her loan appli-
cation would have been accepted.
All of them would be good CEs. All of them would provide information for
a better understanding of the algorithm. i) would be a feasible CE and point
to the most relevant feature that is also causally relevant. ii) is a contesting
CE. It points to a causally irrelevant feature that is important according to
the algorithm. Moreover, it is the same vector as one possible good AE. iii) is
a mixed type CE. It gives information about the most important feature but
at the same time also about a secondary feature that should not matter but
does. Similarly to contesting CEs, it allows contestability but potentially also
feasibility. It would also be an AE, however, not a good one because even though
it is misclassified, it is not imperceptible. It changes the salary feature which as
discussed above is not imperceptible since it is causally relevant.
4.4 AEs as Contesting CEs
This raises the question of whether every good AE makes a good contesting
CE and vice versa. Indeed, the two classes have a great overlap. First, they
both share the potential function of deception. Second, both provide grounds
to contest the judgment of a machine learning algorithm. One difference is that
as all CEs, contesting CEs point to the changes that were made. AEs on the
other hand try to hide the changes as well as possible.
It is clear that every contesting CE is an AE as it must be misclassified to
contest the decision by justified reasons. And, if there is a misclassification,
there will potentially be contexts in which this bug can be exploited. Hence,
most interesting contesting CEs will also be good AEs.
What about the opposite direction? There might be cases where a vector is
a good AE, but a not so good contesting CE. This can happen when many
causally irrelevant features are changed to achieve an alternative classification.
However, it is unclear whether sparsity is a mandatory prerequisite for a good
CE. Especially if the agent aims to deceive a system via a contesting CE she
might not care too much about sparsity. Also, distributed changes in AEs
are mainly relevant in the context of computer vision. However, as we have
mentioned, for CEs the interpretability of features is essential. In the case of
images, one could therefore argue that a minor change in all features means a
change in only one interpretable feature, namely the coloration of the image.
The change of coloration as the only feature is in fact a sparse change and it
can rightly be argued that it is not causally relevant for classification. Thus,
contesting CEs and AEs have at least a large overlap and it is difficult to find
convincing cases that fit in one class but not in the other.
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4.5 Causality as a Unifying Perspective
Many recently proposed papers on CEs have focused on feasibility and action-
ability for generating counterfactuals. This was often achieved by the incorpo-
ration of causal domain knowledge [Poyiadzi et al., 2020, Mahajan et al., 2019,
Karimi et al., 2020]. Since explanations should guide our future actions this
indeed makes sense. However, if an algorithm uses questionable features in its
decisions or misuses features we may want explanations that faithfully reflect
such flaws. In such cases, we are interested in contesting CEs (that reassem-
ble AEs) which point to causally irrelevant features that have influenced the
decision of the learning algorithm.
Summarized we can say that distance measures to build good contesting CEs
(AEs) assign small values to changes in impactful but causally irrelevant fea-
tures. This brings about that only these features are changed since we minimize
the distance to the alternative input. Good distance measures for feasible CEs
on the other hand, assign low values to causally relevant and actionable features,
whereby these features are altered strongest. Hence, we can say that there are
at least two classes of interesting CEs that can in some cases be mixed. Class
one are feasible CEs. They guide the explainee’s future actions by the given
recommendations and stand in accordance with the real-world causal structure.
Class two are contesting CEs. They allow us to contest decisions of algorithms
or deceive them. Thus contesting CEs work just like AEs.
Can this idea of the two complementary approaches be transferred from tabular
data to images? We think that this is indeed possible. The only difference is
that the features we find causally relevant for the classification are composed of
the input features the algorithm receives, namely pixels. Changing all pixels a
little bit or a few pixels strongly is therefore potentially correlated to a different
classification however it is causally irrelevant. This relates to the idea of Ilyas
et al. [2019], where they discuss features that are predictive but not robust.
They argue that these features are the reason for the occurrence of AEs. We
think that one important subclass of such features are correlated, non-causal,
features.
5 Discussion
CEs and AEs are strongly related approaches. Our conceptual comparison has
shown that their commonalities go deeper than the mathematical similarity
alone. However, we have also shown where the two fields differ.
Can our analysis now shed some light on the three misconceptions we discussed
in Section 2? The first misconception was to consider CE and AE as synonyms.
Our analysis has shown that every (targeted) AE is a (targeted) CE, but not
vice versa.36 The most essential difference is that AEs, by definition, need to be
misclassified, whereas CEs are in this respect agnostic. The second misconcep-
tion was to consider feasible CEs as the only relevant type of CEs. We showed
36An example of a CE that is not an AE can be found in the Appendix B
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that contesting CEs are another type of CEs that can be distinguished from
feasible CEs. The difference in function between the two types appears in a
difference in their notion of similarity between inputs. Contesting CEs target
misclassified inputs and show therefore great similarity with AEs. The third
misconception concerns unjustified or missing transfers between the fields. We
discussed under which conditions fruitful interactions are possible. While trans-
fers on the level of the optimization problem or the solution methods are mostly
permissible, transfers on the respective notions of distance are more demanding.
In particular, we argued that feasibility and misclassification are contrary aims,
whereas informativeness and imperceptibility go well together.
6 Outlook
In addition to clarifying some misconceptions, this paper opens various direc-
tions for future research. First and foremost, a preference based selection of
feasible and contesting CEs can be developed. Also, various degrees of con-
testability could be introduced. Second, as suggested a large number of con-
cepts from AEs can be transferred and used in generating CEs. Especially if
the domains of the field show a greater overlap e.g. AEs for tabular data and
CEs for image/audio data, transfers can be extremely beneficial. Conceptually
we need further research on the relation between the paradigm of supervised
learning and the transferability of AEs.
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A Appendix: Formal Proof for AE⊆CE
Here we consider the relation between CEs and AEs in purely mathematical
terms. For all the following, assume there is a function f : I → O mapping a
vector x from a (potentially high dimensional) input space I to a vector y in an
output space O.
Definition. Let x ∈ I, f(x) = y ∈ O and y′ ∈ O.
• We call x′x ∈ I an alternative to x if y 6= f(x′).
• We call x′x,y′ ∈ I a targeted alternative to x if f(x′x,y′) = y′ 6= y.
Definition. A distance measure ‖ · ‖ on a space I is defined as a function
‖ · ‖ : I → R+ ∪ {∞}.
Definition. Let x ∈ I be a vector, x′x ∈ I be an alternative vector,  > 0, and
‖ · ‖ be a distance measure on I.
• We call x′x, an -alternative to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ if ‖x− x′x‖ < .
• We call x′x,y′, a targeted--alternative to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ and target
class y′ if x′x,y′, is a targeted-alternative and an -alternative.
Definition. Let x ∈ I, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O,  > 0, and ‖ · ‖ be a distance measure
on I.
• Let A(x) be the set of all alternatives to x.
• Let TA(x, y′) be the set of all targeted-alternatives to x with target class
y′.
• Let A(x, , ‖ · ‖) be the set of all -alternatives to x with respect to ‖ · ‖.
• Let TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) be the set of all targeted -alternatives to x with
respect to ‖ · ‖ and the target class y′.
Theorem. For all x ∈ I,  > 0, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O and distance measures ‖ · ‖ on
I holds:
i) A(x, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ A(x)
ii) TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TA(x, y′)
iii) TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ A(x, , ‖ · ‖)
iv) TA(x, y′) ⊆ A(x)
v) ∀δ >  : A(x, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ A(x, δ, ‖ · ‖)
vi) ∀δ >  : TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TA(x, y′, δ, ‖ · ‖)
Proof.
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i) Let x ∈ I,  > 0, ‖ · ‖ and z ∈ A(x, , ‖ · ‖) be arbitrary. Then, f(z) 6= f(x).
Thus, z ∈ A(x).
ii) Let x ∈ I,  > 0, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O, ‖ · ‖ and z ∈ TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) be arbitrary.
Then, f(z) = y′ 6= f(x). Thus, z ∈ TA(x, y′).
iii) Let x ∈ I,  > 0, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O, ‖ · ‖ and z ∈ TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) be arbitrary.
Then, f(z) = y′ 6= f(x) and ‖x− z‖ < . Thus, z ∈ A(x, , ‖ · ‖).
iv) Let x ∈ I, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O, and z ∈ TA(x, y′) be arbitrary. Then, f(z) =
y′ 6= f(x). Thus, z ∈ A(x).
v) Let x ∈ I,  < δ, ‖ · ‖ be arbitrary and z ∈ A(x, , ‖ · ‖). Then, by definition
‖x−z‖ <  and f(z) 6= f(x). Together with transitivity in the real numbers
follows ‖x− z‖ < δ. Thus, z ∈ A(x, δ, ‖ · ‖).
vi) Let x ∈ I, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O,  < δ, ‖ · ‖ be arbitrary and z ∈ TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖).
Then, by definition ‖x − z‖ <  and f(z) = y′ 6= f(x). Together with
transitivity in the real numbers follows ‖x−z‖ < δ. Thus, z ∈ TA(x, y′, δ, ‖·
‖).
Definition. Let  > 0
• We call xc a non-targeted  counterfactual to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ if
xc ∈ A(x, , ‖ · ‖). We call xc a non-targeted counterfactual if it is a
non-targeted  counterfactual and for all δ <  holds A(x, δ, ‖ · ‖) = ∅.
• We call xc,y′ a targeted  counterfactual to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ and
targetclass y′ if xc,y′ ∈ TA(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖). We call xc,y′ a targeted coun-
terfactual if it is a targeted  counterfactual and and for all δ <  holds
TA(x, y′, δ, ‖ · ‖) = ∅.
Definition. Let x ∈ I, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O and ‖ · ‖ be a distance measure:
• We call xa a non-targeted () adversarial example to x with respect to ‖·‖
if xa is a non-targeted () counterfactual and there exists a ground truth
yGT ∈ O for xa such that f(xa) 6= yGT .
• We call xa,y′ a targeted () adversarial example to x with respect to ‖ · ‖
and target class y′ if xa,y′ is a targeted () counterfactual and there exists
a ground truth yGT ∈ O for xa,y′ such that y′ = f(xa) 6= yGT .
Definition. Let x ∈ I, f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O,  > 0, and ‖ · ‖ be a distance measure
on I.
• Let CE(x, , ‖·‖) be the set of all non-targeted  counterfactuals to x with
respect to ‖·‖. Let CE(x, ‖·‖) be the set of all non-targeted counterfactuals
to x with respect to ‖ · ‖.
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• Let TCE(x, y′, , ‖·‖) be the set of all targeted  counterfactuals to x with
respect to ‖ · ‖ and target class y′. Let TCE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖) be the set of all
targeted counterfactuals to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ and target class y′.
• Let AE(x, , ‖ · ‖) be the set of all non-targeted  adversarial examples
to x with respect to ‖ · ‖. Let AE(x, ‖ · ‖) be the set of all non-targeted
adversarial examples to x with respect to ‖ · ‖.
• Let TAE(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) be the set of all targeted  adversarial examples to
x with respect to ‖ · ‖ and target class y′. Let TAE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖) be the set
of all targeted adversarial examples to x with respect to ‖ · ‖ and target
class y′.
Theorem (Every (targeted ) AE is a (targeted ) CE). For all x ∈ I,
f(x) 6= y′ ∈ O,  > 0 and distance measures ‖ · ‖ holds:
i) AE(x, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ CE(x, , ‖ · ‖)
ii) TAE(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TCE(x, y′, , ‖ · ‖)
iii) AE(x, ‖ · ‖) ⊆ CE(x, ‖ · ‖)
iv) TAE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖) ⊆ TCE(x, y′, ‖ · ‖)
Proof. All statements follow directly by the definition of adversarials given
above.
This is not true if the environment given by  differs between the (non-)targeted
 CEs and AEs.
B Appendix: Example CE but not AE
In Figure 4, we look at an example where we have a CE but not an AE.37
The nine we see is a counterfactual to the original input. It is a variation of
the original input that points us to the crucial difference between an eight and
a nine, which is the lower-left stroke. Now, we look at it from an adversarial
perspective. The eight looks like an eight. Also, the alternative generated to
the eight which is classified as a nine does look like a nine. This cannot be an
AE because it is not a misclassification.
37Image from Van Looveren and Klaise [2019]
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Figure 4: Above the two pictures you can see the corresponding classes the
algorithm has assigned. The picture classified as an eight is the original data
input. The nine beneath is a counterfactual to the eight.
36
